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Abstract
We study a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: constructing truthful mecha-
nisms for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. Dobzinski,
Nisan, and Schapira provided the first mechanism that guarantees a non-trivial approximation
ratio of O(log2m) [STOC’06], where m is the number of items. This approximation ratio was
subsequently improved to O(logm log logm) [Dobzinski, APPROX’07] and then to O(logm)
[Krysta and Vocking, ICALP’12].
In this paper we develop the first mechanism that breaks the logarithmic barrier. Specif-
ically, the mechanism provides an approximation ratio of O(
√
logm). Similarly to previous
constructions, our mechanism uses polynomially many value and demand queries, and in fact
provides the same approximation ratio for the larger class of XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subaddi-
tive) valuations.
We also develop a computationally efficient implementation of the mechanism for combina-
torial auctions with budget additive bidders. Although in general computing a demand query
is NP-hard for budget additive valuations, we observe that the specific form of demand queries
that our mechanism uses can be efficiently computed when bidders are budget additive.
1 Introduction
The economic field of Mechanism Design mainly deals with games where each strategic participant
privately holds some information. The paradigmatic example is a single item auction, where bidders
are interested in an item that is for sale. The value of each bidder for the item is unknown to the
other bidders. The mechanism design question is to find an auction format that will achieve a
certain social goal. Archetypal examples are Vickrey’s second-price auction [22] that maximizes
the welfare and Myerson’s revenue maximizing auctions [21].
Since the introduction of these classic constructions, we have witnessed the emergence of com-
plex markets such as eBay and Amazon with millions of items that are for sale. Furthermore,
auctions have become significantly larger and complicated than before. Examples include spec-
trum auctions with revenue measured in billions of dollars [5] as well as more recent ones such as
the FCC incentive auctions [19]. These markets introduce new challenges that can be very coarsely
classified into two. The first type is traditional game theoretic challenges, e.g., bidders have com-
plicated preferences over multiple bundles of items and their private information can no longer be
represented by a single number, as in the single item auction case. This considerably limits the set
of tools available to the designer. The second type of challenges is computational considerations:
∗Weizmann Insittute of Science. Incumbent of the Lilian and George Lyttle Career Development Chair. Supported
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some classic designs for these complex settings may have good game theoretic properties but require
solving computationally intractable problems, leading to unacceptable running time.
In a sense, the rise of Algorithmic Mechanism Design can be related to the need to simulta-
neously solve these challenges. A combinatorial auction is a quintessential setting in this field.
The basic definition involves a set of M heterogeneous items (|M | = m) and n bidders. Each
bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2
M → R. It is assumed that each valuation vi is normalized
(vi(∅) = 0) and non decreasing. The usual goal is to find an allocation of the items (A1, . . . , An)
that maximizes the social welfare1 Σivi(Ai). Since we are interested in algorithms that run in time
poly(n,m) and the size of the valuation functions is exponential in m, it is common to assume
that the valuations are given to us as black boxes that can handle specific types of queries. The
two standard queries are value queries (given a bundle S, return v(S)) and demand queries (given
prices p1, . . . , pm return argmaxS v(S) − Σj∈Spj).
To handle the strategic behavior of the bidders we charge each bidder i some payment pi for
the bundle Ai he received. We are looking for truthful mechanisms, where the profit vi(Ai)− pi of
each bidder is maximized when answering queries according to his true valuation.
Numerous variations on the basic problem were studied (see, e.g., the survey [2] and references
within), but most of them demonstrate the basic clash that is in the heart of Algorithmic Mechanism
Design: the VCG mechanism is a truthful mechanism that maximizes the welfare but requires
finding the welfare maximizing allocation, which is usually NP-hard. On the other hand, good
constant factor approximation algorithms exist but are not truthful. The goal is therefore to design
truthful mechanisms with approximation ratios close to what is possible from a pure algorithmic
point of view that completely ignores incentives issues.
1.1 The Main Result: Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
The case where all valuations are submodular (for every S and T , v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩
T )) stands out as a showcase for the power and limitations of computationally efficient truthful
mechanism design. The pure algorithmic aspect of the problem has received much attention as
well (e.g., [15, 18, 20, 16]). Of particular importance is Vondrak’s continuous greedy algorithm [23]
that was initially developed for this setting and its numerous extensions to other problems and
follow-ups. The algorithmic situation is quite well understood and can be summarized as follows:
there is an ee−1 -approximation algorithm that uses polynomially many value queries, and this ratio
is tight [16, 20]. If the more stronger demand queries are allowed then it is possible to break the
e
e−1 -barrier and achieve an approximation ratio of
e
e−1 − 10−6 [15], but it is impossible to get an
approximation ratio better than 2e2e−1 with polynomially many queries [12].
Much less is known about the approximation ratio achievable by polynomial time truthful
mechanisms. If access to the valuations is restricted to value queries, then deterministic mechanisms
cannot achieve an approximation ratio of m
1
2
−ǫ [8], which matches the ratio obtained by [10].
It is therefore natural to consider randomized mechanisms. There are two important notions
of randomized truthful mechanisms. Truthful in expectation mechanisms guarantee that bidding
truthfully maximizes the expected profit. In particular, these mechanisms are inapplicable when
bidders are not risk neutral. In contrast, universally truthful mechanisms are simply a probability
distribution over deterministic mechanisms, and thus it is always better to bid truthfully, regardless
of the attitude towards risk.
The first truthful mechanism with non-trivial guarantee was obtained by [11], which shows
that there is a randomized universally truthful mechanism that guarantees an approximation ratio
1While welfare maximization is probably the most popular goal in the setting of combinatorial auctions, other
goals, e.g., revenue maximization, were also studied.
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of O(log2m). This approximation ratio was later improved to O(logm log logm) [7] and then to
O(logm) [17]. All the above mentioned mechanisms use both demand and value queries.
There were reasons to believe that the “correct” approximation ratio for this problem is O(logm)
and that the lack of improvement is due to our usual inability to prove impossibility results on the
power of truthful polynomial time mechanisms. For example, both [11] and [7] essentially use
a fixed price auction with the same price for each item, and one can show that such auctions
cannot guarantee more than a logarithmic approximation. Furthermore, the analysis is based on
a comparison to a “revenue benchmark”, and it is known that the gap between the welfare and
the revenue might be logarithmic (the so called equal revenue distribution). In a similar vein, the
analysis of the algorithm of [17] is essentially based on the observation that one can approximate
the welfare well in “easy” instances when there are logarithmically many copies of each good.
Unfortunately, the welfare gap between an easy instance and the same instance with only one copy
of each good can be logarithmic.
Even considering the weaker concept of truthfulness in expectation does not seem to help much.
The notable positive result here restricts the valuations to be sum of matroid rank functions. In this
case, there is a truthful in expectation that provides an approximation ratio of ee−1 [13]. However,
for general submodular valuations the best known bound is only O( logmlog logm ) [9] and even this ratio
is obtained by a mechanism that uses non-standard queries.
Despite this, in this paper we are able to break the logarithmic barrier:
Theorem: There exists a randomized universally truthful algorithm for combinatorial auctions
with XOS valuations that achieves an expected approximation ratio of O(
√
logm) to the social
welfare. The algorithm makes poly(m,n) value and demand queries2.
Notice that the new mechanism (as well as all previous ones) actually works for the larger class of
XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive) valuations. A valuation v is additive if for every bundle S
we have that v(S) = Σj∈Sv({j}). A valuation v is XOS if there exist additive valuations a1, . . . , at
such that for every bundle S, v(S) = maxr ar(S). Each ar is a clause of v. If a ∈ argmaxr ar(S)
then a is a maximizing clause of S and a(j) is the supporting price of item j in this maximizing
clause.
1.2 Intuition for the Mechanism
A basic construction used in our mechanism is a fixed price auction. In this auction there is a
price pj for each item j. Initially, M
′ = M . Bidders arrive one by one, in an arbitrary order.
Each bidder i that arrives to the auction takes some bundle Si ⊆ M ′ that maximizes his profit:
Si ∈ argmaxS[vi(S) − Σj∈Spj]. Let M ′ = M ′ − Si and consider the next bidder in the order. At
the end of the auction each bidder i receives the set Si and pays Σj∈Sipj. Observe that the fixed
price auction is truthful as long as no participating bidder affects p1, . . . , pm. Also note that to
implement the auction we need one demand query for each participating bidder.
Let us first see how to obtain a logarithmic approximation to the social welfare using a fixed-price
auction3, and then discuss how to improve the approximation ratio. For simplicity of presentation
2The probability of success for which the mechanism provides a good approximation ratio was also studied in few
cases [11, 7]. In our case, using standard arguments we get that the probability that the mechanism will provide
at least half of its expected value is Ω( 1√
logm
). Notice that unlike traditional algorithm design running a truthful
mechanism more than once usually destroys its incentive properties. In principle, we believe that it should be possible
to imrpove the probability of success of our mechanisms using techniques similar to those of [11, 7]. However, we do
not push this direction in the current manuscript in order to keep our construction a bit simpler. Finally, we note
that the probability of success of the mechanism obtained in [17] is Θ( 1
logm
).
3This slightly improves over the results of [11, 7] in which an O(logm log logm) approximation ratio was obtained
by using a fixed price auction. The logarithmic approximation of [17] is obtained via a more complicated auction.
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assume that all values in the additive valuations that the XOS valuations are constructed from are
integers in {1, 2, 4, 8, . . . ,m}.
Let (O1, . . . , On) be an optimal allocation and ai be the maximizing clause of Oi in the valuation
vi of bidder i. For each bidder i and j ∈ Oi, let qj = ai({j}). Notice that OPT = Σivi(Oi) = Σjqj.
The basic idea is to find prices p1, . . . , pm such that a fixed price auction will output an allocation
with high welfare. Towards this end, we say that we have “correctly guessed” the price of item j
if qj = 2 · pj. It was already observed (e.g., [11, 7] – see also Lemma 4.2 of this paper) that the
welfare obtained by a fixed price auction with prices p1, . . . , pm is at least 2 ·Σj|qj=2·pjqj. Therefore,
our approach is to maximize the total value of correctly guessed items. Notice that in the analysis
we conservatively ignore the contribution of items that were not correctly guessed regardless of
whether their price is “too high” or “too low”.
We first explore the possibility of using a uniform price for all items. Partition the optimal
allocation intos: put all items j with qj = r in bin Gr. For convenience, we will say that the price
associated with bin Gr is r. Let cont(Gr) = |{j|qj = r}| · r denote the contribution of bin Gr to
the optimal solution. As discussed above, the welfare of a fixed price auction with price per item
r/2 is Ω(cont(Gr)). Thus, since Σrcont(Gr) = OPT and since there are logm bins by assumption,
the expected approximation ratio of a fixed-price auction with a random price r/2 is O(logm).
To improve the approximation ratio, we group every
√
logm consecutive bins to a single chunk,
so that we have
√
logm disjoint chunks. For each chunk Ck, denote by val(Ck) = ΣGr∈Ckcont(Gr)
the sum of contributions of bins that are in Ck. Notice that we cannot guarantee now that there is
a fixed price auction with a uniform price that generates welfare of val(Ck), since a chunk consists
of multiple bins that contain items with different qj ’s. However, we might get lucky: let rk be the
smallest price associated with a bin in Ck. If a fixed price auction with uniform price rk/2 returns
welfare of Ω(val(Ck)), we say that Ck is easily approximable. Let NE denote the set of chunks
that are not easily approximable.
In the very lucky case, ΣCk /∈NEval(Ck) ≥ OPT2 . Similarly to before, in this case we get an
approximation ratio of O(
√
logm) by choosing uniformly a random a chunk Ck out of the
√
logm
chunks and running a fixed price auction with price rk/2 for all items.
The situation is more complicated when ΣCk∈NEval(Ck) >
OPT
2 . Our goal now is to run a fixed
price auction that uses multiple prices. Key in this plan is Lemma 4.3 that considers a fixed price
auction with a uniform price rk/2 where bidders arrive in a random order. Let the output of this
auction be (T1, . . . , Tn), so T = ∪iTi is the set of items that were allocated in the fixed-price auction.
The lemma roughly says that if chunk Ck is not easily approximable then E[Σj∈T qj] = Ω(val(Ck)).
Notice that this does not imply that the welfare Σivi(Ti) of the fixed price auction is large: in an
extreme case all items j in the chunk have qj = rk ·2
√
logm whereas the fixed price auction allocates
all items to some bidder i with vi(Ti) = |Ti| · rk/2. However, the lemma does imply that the set
T contains items that contribute much of the value of chunk Ck. Therefore, we can “guess” the
price of all items in T , hoping to correctly guess the price of items that are also in chunk Ck. The
point is that there are only
√
logm bins in a chunk, so in expectation we correctly guess the price
of items that contribute value Ω(val(Ck)√
logm
).
The overall plan is to run a fixed price auction with price rk/2 on every chunk Ck in an increasing
order of k, and guess the price of all items that were allocated in the auction. In general, some
items that were correctly guessed in some fixed price auction with price rk/2 might be (incorrectly)
re-priced in one of the following fixed-price auction with price rk′/2 for k
′ > k. However, we are
able to bound the loss of such re-pricing by making sure that rk′ >> rk. We show, very roughly
speaking, that the total number of items allocated in each fixed-price auction shrinks dramatically,
and therefore the number of items that are re-priced is bounded.
All this hints that we can correctly guess the price of many items and have that Σj|qj=2·pjqj =
4
Ω( OPT√
logm
). Ideally, we would like to run a fixed price auction with these prices, but recall that a
fixed price auction is truthful only when the prices do not depend on the participants‘ valuations,
which is not the case here. Furthermore, how can we determine whether the easily approximable
chunks are significant or not? The second issue turns out to be easy to solve, as we can “guess”
whether the easily approximable chunks are significant or not simply by flipping a random coin.
The solution of the first issue is standard, although the analysis is a bit more delicate than the
usual: we use only half of the bidders in the fixed price auctions that are used to guess prices.
After guessing the pj’s, we run a final fixed-price auction where the participants are the other half
of bidders that were not involved in determining the pj ’s. This guarantees the truthfulness of the
mechanism. The reader is referred to the technical parts for a complete description and analysis of
the mechanism.
1.3 Budget Additive Bidders
As noted above, our mechanism assumes that the valuations are given as black boxes that can
only be accessed via demand queries. However, sometimes the valuations are explicitly given but
simulating a demand query might be NP hard. One extensively studied case (e.g., [1, 4, 3]) is
when all valuations are budget additive: there exists some b such that for every bundle S, v(S) =
min(b,Σj∈Sv({j})). A simple reduction from, say, the knapsack problem shows that simulating a
demand query is NP hard. Yet, we observe that our mechanism uses demand queries of a very
specific form, and these can be computed in polynomial time. Hence:
Theorem: There exists a polynomial time randomized universally truthful algorithm for combi-
natorial auctions with budget additive valuations that achieves an expected approximation ratio of
O(
√
logm).
1.4 Open Questions
The obvious question that we leave open in this paper is determining whether Θ(
√
logm) is the best
possible approximation ratio in our setting. Our mechanism uses both randomization and demand
queries, but – as far as impossibility results are concerned – all we know is that deterministic
mechanisms that use only value queries cannot obtain an approximation ratio of O(m
1
2
−ǫ) [8]. This
result was extended to randomized mechanisms that use value queries [14] (with a constant in the
exponent that is smaller than 12). In particular, we note that nothing is known even about the power
of deterministic mechanisms that use demand queries (but we conjecture that there is not much to
gain here). The interested reader is referred to [6] for possible approaches for proving impossibility
results for computationally efficient truthful mechanisms in general, and for mechanisms that use
only demand and value queries – as the mechanism introduced in this paper – in particular.
We do not know whether our results can be extended to subadditive valuations. The best
known O(logm log logm)-approximation algorithm [7] relies on the fact that for every subadditive
valuation there is an XOS valuation that O(logm)-approximates it4. Thus a logarithmic factor
loss seems inevitable with this approach. Breaking the logarithmic barrier also for subadditive
valuations looks challenging.
4A valuation v α-approximates a valuation v′ if for every bundle S it holds that v(S) ≤ v′(S) ≤ α · v(S).
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Allocations and Bins
Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be some allocation. Let |A| denote Σivi(Ai) rounded up to the nearest power
of 2. Let P = {2k ·|A|
m2
}k∈Z. Suppose that all valuations are XOS and let qj denote the supporting
price of j in Ai, for every i and item j ∈ Ai. Let q′j be the maximal value in P such that qj ≥ q′j.
It will be convenient not to work directly with the set P but rather with bins that reference |A|
only indirectly. Specifically, bin k of the allocation A is k is p(k) = 2
k|A|
m2 (we will also refer to p(k)
as the price associated with bin k in A). We say that item j is in bin k if q′j = p(k). Let nk be the
number of items in bin k. The contribution of bin k in A is p(k) · nk.
We say that the allocation T ′ = (T ′1, . . . , T
′
n) is the allocation T = (T1, . . . , Tn) restricted to a
set of bins B if for each i we have that T ′i = Ti ∩Mb, where Mb is the set of items that are in some
bin in B in the allocation (T1, . . . , Tn). We say that an allocation T = (T1, ..., Tn) is supported by
prices p′1, . . . , p
′
m if for each item j ∈ Ti we have that qj ≥ p′j, where qj is the supporting price of
item j in Ti according to vi. Note that we do not assume that every item j is allocated in T .
2.2 Truthfulness
Let V be some set of valuations. An n-bidder mechanism for combinatorial auctions is a pair (f, p)
where f : V n → A, where A is the set of all allocations, and p = (p1, . . . , pn), where pi : V n → R.
Definition 2.1 Let (f, p) be a deterministic mechanism. (f, p) is truthful if for all i, all vi, v
′
i ∈ V
and all v−i ∈ V n−1 we have that vi(f(vi, v−i)i) − pi(vi, v−i) ≥ v′i(f(v′i, v−i)i) − p(v′i, v−i). (f, p) is
universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms.
3 The Mechanism
We now provide a description of the mechanism. Let α =
√
logm.
1. With probability 1/2 sell the grand bundleM via a second price auction with the participation
of all bidders. The mechanism ends in this case with the allocation and prices of this second-
price auction.
2. Each bidder is assigned independently with equal probability to exactly one of the following
three groups: STAT, UNIFORM, and FINAL.
3. Run the greedy algorithm of [18]5 with the participation of bidders in STAT only.
Let6 APX = (APX1, . . . , APXn) be the output allocation.
4. Partition bins 1, . . . , 4 logm of the allocation APX into α disjoint chunks so that chunk Ck
contains the following bins: {(k − 1) · 4 logmα + 1, . . . , k · 4 logmα }.
5. Select uniformly at random an integer r from the set {1, 2, 3, . . . , 4 logmα }.
6. Choose an order pi over the bidders in UNIFORM uniformly at random. In addition, for every
item j, let pj = 0.
5Any other O(1) approximation algorithm that uses a polynomial number of value and demand queries will yield
similar results.
6Throughout this paper, we denote for notational simplicity allocations to a subset of the bidders such as APX
as allocations for all n bidders by letting APXi = ∅ for each bidder i /∈ STAT .
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7. Consider each chunk Ck, in ascending order:
(a) Let p′ be the smallest price associated with any bin in Ck. Run a fixed price auction
restricted to bidders in UNIFORM with price p′/2 for every item, where the order of the
bidders in UNIFORM is pi (Step 6). Denote the allocation that this fixed-price auction
outputs by T k = (T k1 , . . . , T
k
n ) and by p
i,k the payment of bidder i.
(b) With probability 1α the mechanism ends with the allocation T
k. Each bidder i pays pi,k.
(c) Let p′′ be the price of the bin with the r’th smallest value in Ck. Update the price pj of
every item j ∈ ∪iT ki to pj = p′′/2.
8. Run a fixed price auction with prices p1, . . . , pm with the participation of bidders in FINAL
only. Output the allocation and prices of this final auction.
Before proceeding to a formal analysis of the mechanism, let us make some brief comments.
The heart of the mechanism is clearly the fixed price auctions of Steps 7 and 8. The main issue is
how to determine the prices that will be used in these auctions in a truthful manner. The standard
way to do so is by excluding a random set of bidders from winning items. The valuations of bidders
in the excluded set can be queried in order to set the prices in the fixed price auctions. Since the
excluded set was chosen at random, the hope is that the excluded set is indeed a “representative”
sample and thus the answers to the queries are indeed useful. Note that we expect the bidders in
the excluded set to answer the queries truthfully, since they will not win any items in any case. In
our mechanism, depending on the outcome of the random coins, only bidders in UNIFORM or
bidders in FINAL might win some items. The excluded set is bidders in STAT in the first case
and bidders in UNIFORM ∪ STAT in the second one.
One obvious issue with this approach is that sometimes it is impossible to gather useful infor-
mation by random sampling. For example, perhaps there is one bidder with a valuation that is
very large comparing to the valuations of the other bidders. In this case we have little hope that
the fixed price auctions will provide high welfare: even if the significant bidder is participating in
the fixed price auction, the excluded set is not a representative sample so the prices used in these
auctions might be too low to guarantee a good approximation. The standard way to avoid this is
to “guess” – by flipping a random coin – whether there is a significant contributer to the optimal
welfare. If there is, then a good approximation ratio can be guaranteed by running a second price
auction on the grand bundle (Step 1).
Bidders in UNIFORM are participating in a sequence of fixed-price auctions. Based on the
random coins, they are either allocated the outcome of one random auction, or cannot win items at
all (Step 7). In the latter case, the outcomes of the fixed priced auctions are used to set the prices
in the auction with the participation of bidders in FINAL only (Step 8).
Bidders in STAT are only used to compute the allocation APX. This allocation is used to
determine the prices of the fixed price auctions of Step 7. This is a good time to note that the only
information about the allocation APX that the algorithm uses is its value. This value is used only
to determine the range of prices that will be used in the fixed priced auctions. The algorithm does
not make use of the specific allocation of items in APX or other properties of it. Furthermore,
suppose that we are given that for every item i and bundle S we have that vi(S) ∈ {0} ∪ [1, . . . ,m]
(or, almost equivalently, a good estimate of the optimal solution). In this case we could just let the
mechanism consider prices 1, 2, 4, . . . ,m without making any use of bidders in STAT .
We now turn to the formal analysis of the mechanism.
Theorem 3.1 The mechanism is universally truthful and can be implemented with polynomially
many demand and value queries. It provides an approximation ratio of O(
√
logm).
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We first show that the mechanism is truthful and uses a polynomial number of demand queries.
For truthfulness, observe that the only way for a bidder to receive some item is by participating
in a fixed price auction or a second-price auction. Which of these two auctions is conducted and
which bidders are allowed to participate is determined solely be flipping random coins.
The mechanism is obviously truthful when a second price auction on the grand bundle is con-
ducted. In addition, notice that the price in the fixed-price auctions does not depend on the
valuations of the participating bidders. Moreover, despite participating in multiple auctions, bid-
ders in UNIFORM might only win items in one auction that is determined by the outcome of the
random coins.
This already guarantees that truth telling is an ex-post Nash equilibrium. However, truth-
telling might not be a dominant strategy: for example, the first bidder i in the order pi might
“threat” the second bidder i′ in pi that if bidder i′ reports that his demand consists of, say, exactly
two items in the first fixed-price auction, bidder i will report that his demand consists of all items
in all subsequent auctions (even if his demand is different) thus leaving bidder i′ with no items.
Such issues can be avoided by a careful implementation, for example, by hiding the answers to the
queries of bidders from their predecessors in the order. Alternatively, the mechanism can ask the
first bidder in pi to report his demand for all fixed-price auctions simultaneously. Then, based on
the answers of the first bidder ask the second bidder in pi to report his demand for all fixed-price
auctions simultaneously, and so on.
To see that the bound on the number of demand queries, observe that we run at most α + 1
fixed price auctions, and that each such auction requires at most n demand queries. The next two
sections are devoted to proving the approximation ratio.
4 Analysis of the Approximation Ratio: Auxiliary Lemmas
Variants of the next two lemmas have already appeared in the literature multiple times, e.g., [11, 7]
(proofs in the appendix). In particular, the first lemma is almost an immediate application of the
Hoeffding bounds.
Lemma 4.1 Let S be a random set of bidders where bidder i is in S with probability p independently
of the other bidders. Let (T1, . . . , Tn) be some allocation and suppose that for every bidder i we
have that vi(Ti) ≤ Σkvk(Ti)R . Then, with probability at least 1− 2e−
p·R
2 :
Σi∈Svi(Ti) ≥ p · Σivi(Ti)
2
Lemma 4.2 Let T = (T1, ..., Tn) be an allocation that is supported by prices p
′
1, . . . , p
′
m. A fixed
price auction with prices pj =
p′j
2 generates an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn), with Σivi(Si) ≥
Σj∈∪iTip
′
j
2 .
The next lemma considers a fixed price auction with a random subset of the bidders that arrive in
random order. It compares the quality of the solution to some arbitrary allocation A and shows
that we expect to either get an allocation with a welfare close to that of A or that many of the
items of A were allocated.
Lemma 4.3 Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be an allocation that is supported by p
′
1, . . . , p
′
m. For every item
j ∈ Ai, let qj be its supporting price. Let o = ΣiΣj∈Aiqj. Let N ′ be a random set of bidders where
each bidder is in N ′ independently at random with probability r. Let T = (T1, . . . , Tn) be the random
variable that denotes the allocation of the fixed price auction with price pj =
p′j
2 for every item j
when N ′ is constructed at random as above and the order over bidders in N ′ is chosen uniformly
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at random. Let c = 1 − ΣiΣj∈Ai∩(∪kTk)qjo . Then E[Σivi(Ti)] ≥ o·E[c]·r4 , where expectations are taken
over the random choices of N ′ and its internal order.
Proof: Fix N ′ and its internal order. Consider a fixed-price auction as above and denote by
(T1, . . . , Tn) the allocation of the fixed-price auction. Let W = ∪i∈N ′Ai − ∪i∈N ′Ti be the set of
items that are allocated to bidders in N ′ in (A1, . . . , An) but were not allocated in the fixed price
auction. Our first step is to bound the social welfare of the fixed price auction using W :
Claim 4.4 Σivi(Ti) ≥ Σj∈W qj/2.
Proof: Consider some bidder i ∈ N ′ arriving to the auction. Let A′i = W ∩ Ai. Bidder i
could have taken the set A′i at price Σj∈A′ipj . Observing that vi(A
′
i) ≥ Σj∈A′iqj ≥ 2Σj∈A′ipj we get
that the profit of i from taking A′i is at least Σj∈A′iqj/2. Since the bundle Ti was a most profitable
bundle for i, its profit must be at least Σj∈A′iqj/2 and in particular we have that vi(Ti) ≥ Σj∈A′iqj/2.
Summing up over all bidders in N ′ we get that Σi∈N ′vi(Ti) ≥ Σi∈N ′Σj∈A′iqj/2 = Σj∈W qj/2.
When E[Σj∈W qj] >
o·E[c]
2 (where expectation is taken over the random choice of N
′ and its
internal order), the claim implies that E[Σivi(Ti)] ≥ E[Σj∈W qj/2] > o·E[c]4 ≥ o·E[c]·r4 , as needed (the
last inequality holds since r ≤ 1).
From now on we assume that E[Σj∈W qj] ≤ o·E[c]2 . We prove the claim by running the following
thought experiment. Choose uniformly at random a bidder i′ ∈ N −N ′ to arrive to the fixed price
auction just after the auction with the bidders in N ′ has ended. We will see that the expected
profit of i′ is is at least o·E[c]2n , where expectation is taken over the choices of N
′, its internal order,
and i′. The expected profit of bidders (in N ′) that arrive before i′ is at least the expected profit
of i′, simply because the set of available items does not increase during the auction. Since Ti
is a profit maximizing bundle of each bidder i and since vi(Ti) is at least its profit, we get that
E[vi(Ti)] ≥ o·E[c]2n . By linearity of expectation we conclude that E[Σivi(Ti)] ≥ n ·r · o·E[c]4n ≥ r · o·E[c]4 ,
as claimed. Thus, to finish the proof it remains to bound the profit of i′:
Claim 4.5 The expected profit of bidder i′ is at least o·E[c]2n , where expectation is taken over the
choices of N ′, the internal order of N ′, and i′.
Proof: When i′ arrives the set of available items is M −∪iTi. The expected value of items that
are allocated in A to bidders that are not in N ′ but were not allocated in the fixed price auction is:
E[Σj∈(∪i/∈N′Ai−∪i∈N′Ti)qj] = E[Σj∈∪i∈NAiqj]− E[ΣiΣj∈Ai∩(∪kTk)qj]− E[Σj∈W qj ]
≥ o− E[ΣiΣj∈Ai∩(∪kTk)qj]−
o ·E[c]
2
= o ·E[c] − o ·E[c]
2
=
o ·E[c]
2
Let Oi′ = Ai′ − ∪kTk. Since bidder i′ is selected uniformly at random from N −N ′, we have that
E[vi′(Oi′)] ≥ o·E[c]2n .
Similarly to the proof of Claim 4.4, observe that for every j, qj ≥ 2pj , and therefore when i′
arrives to the auction his profit from taking the bundle Oi′ is at least Σj∈Oi′
qj
2 ≤
vi′ (Oi′ )
2 . Since Ti′
is one of i′’s most profitable bundles, Ti′ must be at least as profitable as Oi′ .
This finishes the proof of Lemma 4.3.
9
5 Analysis of the Approximation Ratio: The Main Proof
We put each instance in one of two sets, and show how to get the desired approximation ratio
in each set. Let (O1, . . . , On) be an optimal allocation and denote its value by OPT = Σivi(Oi).
Bidder i is dominant if vi(M) ≥ OPT√logm .
5.1 Case I: There is a Dominant Bidder
The first set of instances that we consider is the set of instances with at least one dominant bidder.
It is easy to get a good approximation in these instances: with some constant probability in Step
1 we run a second price auction and therefore the bundle of all items will be allocated to bidder
that maximizes vi(M). Bidder i is obviously a dominant bidder. This provides the promised
approximation ratio.
5.2 Case II: No Dominant Bidder
Suppose that there is no dominant bidder. We assume that the mechanism does not terminate
with the second-price auction of Step 1 and our analysis is conditioned on this event, which occurs
with constant probability.
Fix some choice of bidders in STAT (this determines also the allocation APX). Let OFU =
(OFU1 , . . . , O
FU
n ) be some allocation restricted to bidders in FINAL∪UNIFORM . We also assume
that OFU is restricted to bins with prices identical to the prices associated with bins 1, . . . , 4 logm
of the allocation APX. For every bidder i and item j ∈ OFUi , let qj denote the supporting price of
j in OFUi . We sometimes abuse notation a bit and use O
FU = Σivi(O
FU
i ).
Definition 5.1 The value of chunk Ck (denoted val(Ck)) is the sum of the contributions of the
bins in Ck in the allocation (O
FU
1 , . . . , O
FU
n ).
Definition 5.2 We say that chunk Ck was reached if there was an iteration of the loop of Step 7
of the mechanism where Ck was considered (i.e., the mechanism did not terminate earlier).
Claim 5.3 All chunks are reached with probability at least 1e .
Proof: If chunk Ck was not reached then the mechanism terminated at Step 7b in one of
the previous iterations. The probability that the mechanism terminates in a given iteration is 1α
(independently of all other events). Thus the probability that the auction did not terminate in all
previous iterations is (1 − 1α)k ≥ (1 − 1α )α ≈ 1e . In particular, the chunk with the largest index is
reached with probability at least 1e . However, for this chunk to be reached all chunks with smaller
indices must be reached as well.
Definition 5.4 Consider a chunk Ck. We say that chunk Ck is easily approximable if E[Σivi(T
k
i )] ≥
val(Ck)
32 , where T
k is the allocation constructed in Step 7b when Ck is reached and expectation is
taken over the random choices of the bidders in UNIFORM and their internal order (after fixing
the bidders in STAT).
Let NE be the set of chunks that are not easily approximable. The analysis of case II is divided into
two. In the first part, assume that ΣCk /∈NEval(Ck) ≥ 15 · ΣCk∈NEval(Ck). We will show that the
expected welfare in this case is Ω(O
FU
α ). When ΣCk /∈NEval(Ck) <
1
5 ·ΣCk∈NEval(Ck), we will show
that the expected welfare of the fixed price auction of Step 8 (which is reached with probability 1e )
is α·O
FU
64 logm −α · OPT4 log2m . These statements will hold for any allocation OFU as defined above. We will
also see that when choosing the bidders in STAT, with high probability there exists an allocation
OFU with OFU = Ω(OPT ). Thus the overall approximation ratio is O(α) = O(
√
logm).
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5.2.1 Case IIa: The Value of Easiliy Approximable Chunks is Large
Assume that ΣCk /∈NEval(Ck) ≥ 15 · ΣCk∈NEval(Ck). For every chunk Ck /∈ NE define Ek to
be the event in which chunk Ck is reached and the mechanism terminates then in Step 7b. Let
Wk = Pr[Ek] ·E[Σivi(T ki )].
Observe that since the Ek’s are disjoint the expected welfare of the mechanism is at least
Σk/∈NEWk. We now compute a lower bound to Wk. By Claim 5.3, Ck is reached with probability
1
e . If Ck is reached, then with probability
1
α (independently of any other events) the auction ends
with the allocation (T k1 , . . . , T
k
n ). Since Ck is easily approximable in this case we have that in this
case E[Σivi(T
k
i )] ≥ val(Ck)32 . Thus, for every chunk Ck /∈ NE, Wk = val(Ck)32e·α . Considering that we
assume that ΣCk /∈NEval(Ck) ≥ O
FU
6 , we have that the expected welfare of the mechanism is at
least ΣCk /∈NEWk = ΣCk /∈NE
val(Ck)
32e·α =
OFU
192·e·α .
Example 5.5 Consider a combinatorial auction with n additive bidders and n items. The value of
bidder i for each item j 6= i is vi({j}) = 0. For i = j we have that vi({j}) > 0. For concreteness, let
us suppose that each vi({j}) is chosen uniformly at random from the set {1, 2, 4, 8, . . . ,m}. Clearly,
the optimal solution is to give item i to each player i. Denote the value of the optimal allocation by
OPT . Observe that with high probability the value of the optimal welfare restricted to UNIFORM
is Θ(OPT ). Moreover every chunk is easily approximable since item i is demanded only by player
i. The approximation ratio is therefore O(
√
logm).
One could attempt to complicate the example and add bidders with “low” values to prevent
bidders to take the item they demand by increasing the competition in the fixed price (say, adding
a bidder with valuation v(S) = |S|). This might make some chunks not easily approximable. The
analysis of the next case shows that we can take advantage of intensive competition by using the
bidders in UNIFORM to infer some information about the prices of items in the optimal solution
restricted to bidders in FINAL.
5.2.2 Case IIb: The Value of Easily Approximable Chunks is Small
We now assume that ΣCk /∈NEval(Ck) <
1
5 ·ΣCk∈NEval(Ck). In the analysis of this case we assume
that all chunks were reached. By Claim 5.3 this happens with probability 1e . We need more
notation.
Definition 5.6 Consider some chunk Ck. Let Mk be the set of items in the allocation O
FU that
are in bins that belong to Ck. Let (T
k
1 , . . . , T
k
n ) be the outcome of the fixed price auction of Step 7b
when Ck is reached. The set of available items of chunk Ck is Lk = Mk ∩ (∪iT ki ). The available
value of chunk Ck is Σj∈Lkqj.
Claim 5.7 The expected available value of every chunk Ck that is not approximable is at least
3val(Ck)
4 . Moreover, the expected sum of available value in all chunks is at least
5OFU
8 .
Proof: We use Lemma 4.3 for the proof of this claim. Using the notation of the statement
of Lemma 4.3, we let (A1, . . . , An) be the allocation O
FU restricted to bins in Ck. Ck is not
approximable hence E[Σivi(T
k
i )] <
val(Ck)
32 . Lemma 4.3 gives that (again using the notation of the
statement of the lemma and observing that r = 12 , since UNIFORM is a random group that consists
of half of the bidders in FINAL ∪ UNIFORM):
val(Ck)
32
≥ val(Ck) ·E[c]
8
=⇒ E[c] ≤ 1
4
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Recall that c = 1− ΣiΣj∈Ai∩(∪kTk)qjΣivi(Ai) , and thus we get that E[ΣiΣj∈Ai∩(∪kTk)qj] ≥ 34 · Σivi(Ai). The
first part of the claim follows since Mk = ∪iAi. The second part of the claim follows by using
linearity of expectation and our assumption that ΣCk∈NEval(Ck) ≥ 5O
FU
6 .
A bin that belongs to chunk Ck is colored if it was selected in Step 7c. The set of correctly
priced items of a bin that was colored is the set of items COLk in that bin that are also in Lk (the
set of available items of Ck). Correctly priced items are essentially items that we “guessed” their
supporting price in the allocation OFU correctly. The next claim shows that we can correctly guess
a large chunk of any set R that consists of items that are all available. Eventually, we will set R to
be the set of items in OFU that belong to bidders in FINAL.
Claim 5.8 Let R ⊆ ∪kLk be some set of available items. E[Σj∈R∩(∪kCOLk)qj] ≥
α·Σj∈Rqj
4·logm .
Proof: Since there are 4 logmα bins in each chunk and the colored bin is chosen uniformly at random,
the expected value of the correctly priced items of chunk Ck that are also in R is
α·Σj∈R∩Lkqj
4·logm . The
claim now follows by using linearity of expectation.
It is possible that we correctly guessed the price of a certain item, but unfortunately re-priced it
in one of the next iterations. The next lemma bounds the value of items “lost” due to this incorrect
re-pricing.
Lemma 5.9 Consider an iteration k of the mechanism and let M ′k be the set of items that belong
to some chunk Ck′, k
′ < k and were repriced at price p′ in Step 7c of iteration k. If α < logmlog logm
then Σj∈M ′kqj ≤
OPT
2 log2m
.
Proof: Observe that since in each chunk only the r’th smallest bin is colored, there are least
4 logm
α bins that separate the bin of every item j ∈ M ′k and the currently colored bin. The price
doubles in each consecutive bin, and therefore p′ ≥ p · 2 4 logmα ≥ p · log2m, where p is the largest
price of an item in M ′k before Ck is considered. Since the welfare of any allocation is at most OPT :
OPT ≥ Σivi(T ki ) ≥ |M ′k| · p′ ≥ |M ′k| · p · log2m
Where in the second inequality we use |M ′k| ⊆ ∪iT ki (because each item in M ′k was allocated in
the fixed price auction of iteration k) and the fact that the allocation of the fixed price auction
of iteration k is supported by p′. Now observe that 2Σj∈M ′kqj ≤ |M ′k| · p, since items in M ′k were
correctly colored with price at most p. Together we get that Σj∈M ′kqj ≤
OPT
2 log2m
.
Now we are ready to bound the welfare of the final fixed price auction.
Lemma 5.10 Suppose that the mechanism reaches Step 8. Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be a random
variable that denotes a welfare-maximizing allocation among all allocations that are restricted to
bidders in FINAL and are supported by p1, . . . , pm. Then, E[Σj∈∪iAipj] ≥ α·O
FU
32·logm − α · OPT2 log2m .
Proof: In this proof we denote by (OF1 , . . . , O
F
n ) the allocation (O
FU
1 , . . . , O
FU
n ) restricted to
bidders in FINAL. Observe that since FINAL is a random set of bidders we have that E[Σivi(O
F
i )] =
OFU
2 . Let R = (∪iOFi ) ∩ (∪kLk) be the set of items that are allocated in the allocation OF and
also belong to the set of available items. By Claim 5.7, E[Σj∈∪kLkqj] ≥ 5O
FU
8 . We therefore claim
that E[Σj∈Rqj] = E[Σj∈∪kLkqj]− E[Σj /∈∪iOFi qj] ≥
5OFU
8 − O
FU
2 =
OFU
8 . Denote the set of items in
R that are correctly priced by R′. By Claim 5.8, E[Σj∈R′qj] ≥ α·
OFU
8
4·logm =
α·OFU
32·logm . By Lemma 5.9 at
each one of the α iterations we lose at most OPT
2 log2m
of that value.
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Let G be the set of items that were correctly priced and not repriced in later iterations. For
each i, let Ai = (O
F
i ∩ T ′) − G. Observe that (A1, . . . , An) is supported by p1, . . . , pm. By the
discussion above:
E[Σj∈∪iAipj] ≥
α · OFU
32 · logm − α ·
OPT
2 log2m
5.2.3 Concluding Case II: Existence of an Allocation with High Value
The next lemma is a “standard” random sampling argument with a small addition. Roughly
speaking, it considers randomly partitioning a set of bidders to two sets of (almost) equal size –
STAT and UNIFORM ∪ FINAL. The lemma says that when there is no dominant bidder, we
will get a good approximation to the optimum in both sets, even when ignoring items with very low
contribution (where contribution is according to the value of the items in the XOS clause). The
proof is simple: standard random sampling arguments tell us that the optimal solution restricted to
STAT and to FINAL∪UNIFORM have roughly the same value (OPT S and OPTFU). However,
we have to ignore the contribution of items that are too small (say, below OPTFU/m2) since the
mechanism considers only logarithmically many prices. The point is that APX/m2 is in the same
ballpark of OPTFU/m2, so we can use the former as a good approximation to the latter without
losing much, recalling that APX is an O(1) approximation to OPT S.
Lemma 5.11 With probability 1−o(1) there is an allocation (OFU1 , . . . , OFUn ) to bidders in FINAL∪
UNIFORM that is restricted to bins with prices identical to the prices associated with bins 1, . . . , 4 logm
of the allocation APX such that Σivi(O
FU
i ) ≥ OPT8 .
Proof: Let (OPTFU1 , . . . , OPT
FU
n ) be an optimal allocation restricted to bidders in FINAL ∪
UNIFORM and let (OPT S1 , . . . , OPT
S
n ) be the optimal allocation restricted to bidders in STAT .
Applying Lemma 4.3 twice and using the union bound, with probability 1− o(1) it holds that:
Σivi(OPT
FU
i ) ≥
OPT
6
,Σivi(OPT
S
i ) ≥
OPT
6
In particular, the welfare of the allocation OPTFU is high. It remains to show that when restricting
OPTFU to bins 1, . . . , 4 logm of APX we do not lose much. Towards this end, recall that OPT ≥
Σivi(APXi) ≥ Σivi(OPT
S
i )
2 ≥ OPT12 . Thus if the price associated with bin k in the allocation APX is
p(k), and the price associated with bin k′ in the allocation OPT S is also p(k), then k+3 ≥ k′ ≥ k−3.
Moreover the difference between every two bins in APX and OPT S that share the same price is
the same and equals k − k′.
Observe that for any allocation A, bins with indices larger 2 logm+ 3 are in fact empty in any
allocation, since the contribution of every item that belongs to such bin is greater than |A|, which
is impossible. Since we restrict our attention to bins 1, . . . , 4 logm, the only items in OPT S that
we might miss are those that are in bins with indices at most 4. The next claim shows that this
loss is bounded.
Claim 5.12 Fix an allocation A and let P be the set of items in bins with indices at most 4.
Σj∈P qj ≤ 16|A|m .
Proof: For every item j in bin k ≤ 4, it holds that qj ≤ 16|A|m2 . We have at most m items and so
the total value of items in these bins is at most m · 16|A|
m2
= 16|A|m .
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We can finally define the allocation OFU from the statement of the lemma: it is the allocation
OPTFU restricted to bins 5, . . . , 4 logm. By Claim 5.12 we have that Σivi(O
FU
i ) ≥ Σivi(OPTFUi )−
16Σivi(OPTFUi )
m ≥
3Σivi(OPTFUi )
4 ≥ OPT6 · 34 = OPT8 .
We now conclude the proof of the approximation ratio for case II. We showed that the expected
welfare is at least O
FU
192e·α or that we have found prices such that there is an allocation to bidders in
FINAL such that the supported value by these prices is at least α·O
FU
32·logm−α · OPT2 log2m . By Lemma 5.11
with very high probability OFU = OPT8 , thus in the first case we get an expected approximation
ratio of O(α) = O(
√
logm). In the second case we have that the mechanism reaches the final fixed
price auction with probability 1e , and in this case Lemma 4.2 gives us that the expected welfare is
at least:
1
2
·
(
α · OFU
32 · logm − α ·
OPT
2 log2m
)
≥ 1
2
·
(√
logm ·OPT
256 · logm −
√
logm · OPT
2 log2m
)
≥
√
logm ·OPT
1024 · logm =
OPT
1024 · √logm
which gives us O(
√
logm) approximation in this case as well.
6 Implementation for Budget Additive Bidders
We would like now to implement the mechanism for budget additive bidders. The mechanism from
the previous sections works for general XOS functions but requires access to value and demand
queries. To apply it to budget additive valuations, we need to show how to efficiently simulate
these queries when the valuations are explicitly given to us as input.
In general, computing a demand query for budget additive bidders is NP hard. However, observe
that the algorithm uses only demand queries with prices that can be written pj = c · tj, where c is
some constant and tj is some integer between 1 and poly(m). We show that these demand queries
can be computed by a polynomial time algorithm, which implies a polynomial time implementation
of the mechanism for budget additive bidders. For simplicity we assume below that c = 1. This
is without loss of generality since for every budget additive valuation v we can run the algorithm
below for the budget additive valuation v′ where v′(s) = v(s)/c.
Proposition 6.1 Let v be a budget additive valuation. Let p1, . . . , pm be integers between 1 and
poly(m). A bundle S that maximizes v(S) − Σj∈Spj can be found in time poly(m).
Proof: Notice that the sum of prices of every combination of items can get only poly(m) values.
Denote the possible sums by q1, . . . , qt (t = poly(m)). We now use a dynamic programming to
find the profit maximizing bundle of items. Define a matrix A of dimensions |M | × t, with the
intention to write in cell A(j, k) a value maximizing set S ⊆ {1, . . . , j} such that Σj′∈Spj′ ≤ qk.
Cells in the first row can be easily computed, and we fill in the next rows one by one using
A(j, k) = argmax(v(A(j, k − 1)), v(A(j − 1, k′) + {j})), where k′ is such that qk′ = qk − pj.
Corollary 6.2 There is a universally truthful mechanism for budget additive bidders that provides
an expected approximation ratio of O(
√
logm).
14
References
[1] Nir Andelman and Yishay Mansour. Auctions with budget constraints. In Algorithm Theory-
SWAT 2004, pages 26–38. Springer, 2004.
[2] Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan. Combinatorial Auctions (a survey). In “Algorithmic Game
Theory”, N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos and V. Vazirani, editors.
[3] Dave Buchfuhrer, Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Elchanan Mossel, Christos
Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer, and Chris Umans. Inapproximability for
VCG-based combinatorial auctions. In ACM-SIAM SODA, pages 518–536, 2010.
[4] Deeparnab Chakrabarty and Gagan Goel. On the approximability of budgeted allocations and
improved lower bounds for submodular welfare maximization and GAP. In IEEE FOCS, pages
2189–2211, 2008.
[5] Peter Cramton. Spectrum auctions. 2002.
[6] Shahar Dobzinski. Computational efficiency requires simple taxation. Working paper.
[7] Shahar Dobzinski. Two randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In APPROX,
pages 89–103, 2007.
[8] Shahar Dobzinski. An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular
valuations. In ACM STOC, pages 139–148, 2011.
[9] Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, and Roberk Kleinberg. Optimal auctions are easy. Working paper.
[10] Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Approximation algorithms for combi-
natorial auctions with complement-free bidders. In ACM STOC, pages 610–618, 2005.
[11] Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Truthful randomized mechanisms for
combinatorial auctions. In ACM STOC, pages 644–652, 2006.
[12] Shahar Dobzinski and Jan Vondra´k. The computational complexity of truthfulness in combi-
natorial auctions. In ACM EC, pages 405–422, 2012.
[13] Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, and Qiqi Yan. From convex optimization to randomized
mechanisms: Toward optimal combinatorial auctions for submodular bidders. In ACM STOC,
pages 149–158, 2011.
[14] Shaddin Dughmi and Jan Vondra´k. Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial
auctions. In IEEE FOCS, pages 502–511, 2011.
[15] Uriel Feige and Jan Vondra´k. Approximation algorithms for allocation problems: Improving
the factor of 1-1/e. In IEEE FOCS, pages 667–676, 2006.
[16] Subhash Khot, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, and Aranyak Mehta. Inapproximability
results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions. In WINE, pages 92–101,
2005.
[17] Piotr Krysta and Berthold Vo¨cking. Online mechanism design (randomized rounding on the
fly). In ICALP, pages 636–647, 2012.
[18] Benny Lehmann, Daniel Lehmann, and Noam Nisan. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing
marginal utilities. In ACM EC, pages 18–28, 2001.
15
[19] Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal. Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation.
In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014.
[20] Vahab Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, and Jan Vondra´k. Tight information-theoretic lower
bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions. In ACM EC, pages 70–77, 2008.
[21] R. B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1):58–73,
1981.
[22] W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance,
pages 8–37, 1961.
[23] Jan Vondra´k. Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle
model. In ACM STOC, pages 67–74.
A Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Recall the following tail bound:
Proposition A.1 (Hoeffding bound) Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independent random variables, such
that for each i we have that Xi ∈ [ai, bi]. Let X = ΣiXin . Then,
Pr[|X − E[X ]| ≥ t] ≤ 2e−
2n2t2
Σi(bi−ai)2
Corollary A.2 Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independent random variables such that Xi = bi with probability
p and 0 with probability 1− p. Suppose that bi ≤ l for all i. Let X = ΣiXi. Then,
Pr[|X −E[X]| > α ·E[X]] ≤ 2e− 2α
2·p·E[x]
l
Proof: (of Corollary A.2) Let t = α·E[X]n . Applying Proposition A.1:
Pr[|X − E[X]| > α · E[X]] ≤ 2e−
2n2(
α·E[X]
n )
2
Σi(bi)
2 ≤ 2e
− 2(α·E[X])2
E[x]
l·p ·l2 = 2e−
2α2·p·E[x]
l
For every bidder k denote by Ak the random variable that receives the value vk(Tk) if k ∈ S
and 0 otherwise. Let A = ΣkAk. We will show that with the specified probability A ≥ p ·Σk vk(Tk)2 .
Since every bidder belongs to S with probability p we have that E[A] = p · Σkvk(Tk). By the
conditions of the lemma for each k we have that Ak <
Σkvk(Tk)
R . Hence, by Corollary A.2:
Pr[A < p · Σkvk(Tk)
2
] ≤ Pr[|A− p · Σkvk(Tk)| ≥ p · Σkvk(Tk)
2
] ≤ 2e− p·R2
Proof of Lemma 4.2
For every bidder i, let Wi = ∪i′<iSi′ denote the set of items that were allocated before bidder i
arrives to the auction.
Let OPTi = Σj∈(∪i′≥iTi)−Wip
′
j . Observe that OPT1 = Σj∈∪iTip
′
j and that OPTn+1 = 0. We will
show that for every i, 2 · vi(Si) ≥ OPTi −OPTi+1, which implies the lemma.
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Notice that for every bidder i, Wi+1 = Wi + Si and that the allocation Ai = (∅, . . . , ∅, Ti −
Wi, Ti+1−Wi, . . . , Tn−Wi) is still supported by p′1, . . . , p′m. Therefore, OPTi−OPTi+1 = Σj∈(Ti−Wi)p′j+
Σj∈Sip
′
j .
We finish the proof by showing that OPTi−OPTi+1 ≤ 2vi(Si). To see that, observe that bidder i
could gain a profit of at least vi(Ti−Wi)−Σj∈(Ti−Wi)pj = vi(Ti−Wi)−Σj∈(Ti−Wi)
p′j
2 ≥ Σj∈(Ti−Wi)
p′j
2
by choosing Ti −Wi (using the fact that p′1, . . . , p′m support the allocation Ai). Since Si is one of
bidder i’s most profitable sets, it is at least as profitable as Ti−Wi, i.e., vi(Si)−Σj∈Si
p′j
2 ≥ vi(Ti−Wi)2 .
We have that vi(Si) ≥ vi(Ti−Wi)2 +Σj∈Si
p′j
2 ≥ Σj∈(Ti−Wi)
p′j
2 +Σj∈Si
p′j
2 =
OPTi−OPTi+1
2 .
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